The survey begins with the first joint operation that Australian Forces undertook in 1914. This paper is a survey of the major joint operations undertaken by Australian Forces in the past one hundred years and aims to examine key factors such as the changing mechanisms for joint operations, doctrine and equipment. This paper concludes that Tarawa was the key element proving that the interwar tank doctrine of the Marine Corps Tentative Manual for Landing Operations was founded on Army tactical principles creating a dramatically different understanding of how tanks were effectively employed to support amphibious operations.ĭuring the 20th century, joint operations-and particularly amphibious operations-have played an important role in the defence of Australia. The result of this conference was a revised table of organization for the Marine Corps that lasted through the Vietnam War and the publication of the manual for Marine Corps Amphibious Operations: Employment of Tanks (Phib-18) in 1946.
With this information, the assault and inland operations on Tarawa becomes a starting point for tracking doctrinal change followed by summaries of tank operations throughout the Central Pacific culminating with the strategic discussion amongst FMF PAC leaders at the Tank Matter’s Conference that convened in May 1945.
ARNOLD SCREW YOUR FREEDOM MANUALS
To show doctrinal progress and indicate changes, it highlights key sources such as Tables of Organization (T/Os) for tank battalions, compares Army and Marine Corps field manuals during the inter-war and post-war period, and references commentary in after action reports and veteran interviews. It explains why the battle for Tarawa became the primary element that shed light on flawed the interwar doctrine founded on fundamentally different principles of employing tanks in combat. Army's influence on the employment of armor by the Marine Corps and its doctrinal progression in the Pacific Theater of Operations.
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